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The Doha Development Agenda: The Stakes Are High For Turkey
When a child is born in the city of
İnegöl,
in the Sea of Marmara region in Turkey, the family only gives it a name seven days after its
birth. On the seventh day, the parents and
the relatives, at a bis party, collectively
decide on the name of the child. Then the
eldest man of the family holds the baby in
his lap, turns his face to the South,
recites the
Azan
and whispers the name into the ear of the baby three times. Thus a name has been given to the child.
Giving a name to a round of trade negotiations is also a
complex business. Like in Turkey, there is a
collective decision, a celebration and quite
a lot of movement and whispering in the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) family. What
trade negotiators have not yet learnt from
the wise people of the Marmara Sea is to
wait some time before they agreed on a name.
The current round of trade negotiations -
the Doha Development Agenda, or DDA in our
jargon bears the name of the city of Doha,
the capital of Qatar, where the round was
launched in a WTO Ministerial in 2001. It
also has the word "Development" in it: -
meaning that this round should be aimed at
making the rules of world trade more
development-friendly.
The decision by WTO Members in 2001 to designate the Doha Round a
development Round was a recognition that there
remain imbalances in the trading system that need to
be corrected, with an eye firmly fixed on
development needs. The intention, therefore, was -
and still is - to try to improve the multilateral
disciplines and the commitments by all Members of
the WTO in such a way that they provide developing
countries with conditions to reap the benefits of
opening trade. But the road is difficult and we have
been through ups and downs.
In 2001, in Doha, the Members of the WTO celebrated joyful moments
when they launched a new Round of negotiations. In
2003, WTO Members experienced difficult moments at
Cancun, Mexico, when many feared that the
multilateral trading system had lost its sense of
direction.
In July 2004, after many sleepless nights, Members agreed on the
July Framework
- a set of principles to guide the remainder of the negotiations.
In December 2005, a ray of hope again appeared, with
the progress made at the WTO Ministerial Conference
which took place in Hong Kong, China. In July
2006, Members had to face up to the
"suspension" of the negotiations; again the negotiations were
thrown to the bottom of the valley. In January 2007,
after a few months of quiet diplomacy, and faced
with the fearful possibility of a dangerous failure,
WTO Members decided to resume formally the
negotiations. Since February 2007, the negotiations
have restarted in full mode in all negotiating
areas. Members are also working bilaterally,
touching base and checking the impact of possible
compromise numbers on products of their major export
interests and main import sensitivities. There is
also renewed engagement and support at the highest
political level. What is really at stake highlights
the crucial importance of the DDA.
The prospect of a failure of the negotiations, brandished
rhetorically before July, is now seen by many
Members as a serious possibility, and the
consequences of such a failure are now emerging more
clearly - not as a major economic shock that would
precipitate any particular market crisis, or a
breakdown in trade or in the operating environment
in the short-term, but rather as a slowly developing
disease that would progressively sap the strength of
the multilateral trading system built up over the
past 50 years, damaging its economic lungs, its
political heart, and its systemic bone structure.
In terms of market access or new disciplines, what is
already on the table is worth two to three times the
Uruguay Round which preceded the Doha Round.
Negotiations have been difficult precisely because
of the high level of ambition established at the
outset. And this applies equally to the conventional
North-South dimension as well as to the newer
South-South dimension. Suffice it to recall that in
the space of ten years, the proportion of developing
countries in world trade has gone from one third to
half the total.
There could be damage to the political heart as
conceived in 2001, when priority was given to
development and to the correction of imbalances that
persisted in the international trading order. It is
now an acknowledged fact that, should the
negotiations fail, the main victims of the WTO's
inability to correct the inequalities that the
Uruguay Round had begun to narrow in the
agricultural or textiles and clothing areas, would
be the weakest and the poorest. In other words, the
developing countries, and in particular the least
developed countries, for whom a successful outcome
represents a hope of dealing with the adverse
effects of agricultural subsidies on cotton or
sugar, or of gaining unhampered access to the
markets of the rich countries. In other words, the
DDA
would not contribute to the Millennium
Objectives as adopted by the UN! Failure would also
mean a weakening of the systemic bone structure,
which holds together the multilateral trading system
that acts as an insurance policy against
protectionist tendencies. Like any insurance policy,
it has to be updated from time to-time and its value
is only evident when the accident takes place.
Sometimes, it is too late. As for the bilateral
insurance policies, however fashionable they appear
to be, we know that they are of lesser value. They
do not cover all trade, and they are worth nothing
when it comes to disciplines on agricultural
subsidies, fishery subsidies, or antidumping that
are of considerable interest to the developing
countries.
To take a few examples in the area of agriculture, the DDA
would provide two to three times greater reductions
on tariffs and subsidies than the Uruguay Round;
export subsidies would be totally eliminated by 201
3; there would be duty-free and quota-free
treatment
for the world's poorest countries' exports; and more
ambitious treatment for cotton. In the area of
tariffs on industrial products, higher tariffs would
be subject to higher cuts. Moreover a DDA deal would
address non-tariff barriers and would also offer
duty-free and quota-free treatment for the world's
poorest countries' exports. The negotiation also
covers rules on trade facilitation that would
improve efficiency of transactions by further
expediting the movement, release and clearance of
goods. In services, Members have already agreed to
deeper opening of sectors such as financial
services, telecommunications, environmental services
and a broad range of business services. In the area
of rules, the DDA would reform anti-dumping
procedures to enhance transparency and
predictability; rules would also limit subsidies on
fisheries in addition to the mechanism already
agreed to enhance the transparency of regional trade
agreements.
In all these sectors, Turkey has a strong interest in
ensuring a rapid and positive conclusion of the DDA.
For example on industrial tariffs through the
reduction formula in this Round, WTO Members can,
for the first time, address the tariff peaks, high
tariffs and tariff escalation particularly for
access to rich markets but also to the major
developing markets. Turkey is a very strong player
in these industrial tariff negotiations as it is in
its interest to ensure its trading partners reduce
their import tariffs to a level equivalent to its
own average applied tariff rate which is fairly low
at 5.4%. If the negotiations fail this unique
opportunity will be missed.
In the trade facilitation negotiations, Turkey has been a
very active player and has tabled various proposals
relating to publication and availability of
information, including internet publication; advance
rulings; and formalities connected with the
importation and exportation of goods. These include
automation, single-window, pre-arrival clearance,
expedited procedures for express shipments and risk
management and analysis.
Turkey has also been quite active in the services negotiations. It
seeks improved market access in a number of sectors,
including construction and related engineering
services, where its industries have flourished in
markets in South Asia, North Africa, the Middle East
or the Balkans.
Turkey's active participation in the WTO generally and in
the DDA in particular reflects the firm conviction
that trade opening can help the Turkish people,
provided that the adequate adjustment mechanisms are
in place to ensure a smooth economic transition.
Indeed, given the high proportion of trade to
Turkey's GDP and the openness of the Turkish
economy, an ambitious Doha Round would be in
Turkey's best interests.
What have I learned from The past 5 years, from the ups and downs,
from ttiose joyous moments and bitter hours?
First, I have found that there has always been an underlying
force that helps us get out of the most difficult
situations and gives us hope at times of despair. It
is our belief that a strong WTO reflects the
widespread desire to operate in a fairer and more
open multilateral trading system which provides a
stable anchor to our economies as they become more
intertwined. It is the acknowledgement that this
system has contributed significantly to economic
growth, development and employment throughout the
past 50 years. It is the belief that international
trade can play a major role in growth and poverty
alleviation and all our people can benefit from the
increased opportunities and welfare gains that the
multilateral trading system generates.
Secondly, it is important to realize that the
negotiation process has moved forward, bit by bit,
layer by layer, to its present stage when
negotiators showed understanding for each others'
concerns, when negotiators not only thought about
their own national interests, but also kept the
value and good of the system in mind and made joint
efforts towards compromise solutions. When all
countries were ready to make their contribution,
with richer countries making a bigger contribution
than poorer countries. We witnessed this kind of
cooperative atmosphere in the final stages at the
Doha Ministerial, in Geneva in 2004 and in Hong Kong
in 2005. I hope to see this happen again in the
corning months, in order to open the way towards the
conclusion of the Round. I count on Turkey to help
move the DDA ship towards a safe harbour soon.
Kaynak:
Pascal LAMY
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